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How European is the European Central Bank's monetary policy? 
Estimating the differential impact of the ECB's interest rate policy on the Eurozone 
states  
Teodora D. Petrova, Illinois Wesleyan University 
 
 
 
 
Ever since its establishment in 1999, the European Central Bank worked on 
maintaining relative price stability mainly through inflation targeting. The ECB aims at 
a target inflation rate below but close to 2%. However, the diversity among the 
member states in the European Union and the Eurozone requires not only collective 
attention on the EU economy but also on each individual member state. Some 
Eurozone member states experience generally higher levels of inflation and higher 
unemployment. On the other side are countries like Germany which are more 
concerned with maintaining low inflation only. Many economists and politicians 
criticize the ECB for its monetary decision-making, which affects various member 
states differently and could drive their economies out of alignment (Salvatore, 2002).  
The literature on the topic suggests a theory also known as the German 
Dominance Hypothesis (GDH), which explains the prevailing role of Germany and 
German's economic objectives on the ECB decision-making process. The main 
purpose of this paper is to study the reasoning behind this commonly spread criticism 
of the European Central bank and test if the ECB's monetary policy is beneficial for 
the Eurozone members as a whole or only for a select group of countries, which have 
similar economic profiles. Or in other words, the paper establishes the differential 
impact of the ECB monetary policies on the Eurozone member states with the 
expectations that the policy will benefit mostly the German economy and other 
economies with similar low-inflation targeting needs and will negatively impact others, 
which face high unemployment rates, in general.  
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I. Introduction 
 The United States of Europe, more often referred to as the European Union (EU), were 
first united shortly after World War II in an attempt to establish long-term peace and trade 
relations between the former war enemies, France and Germany.  Soon, more countries 
joined the European Community and formed the entity now known as the European Union. 
The EU today consists of 27 member states. Its main goals are political and economic stability 
through a unified political system and one free market for goods and labor. The more the 
Union expanded the more urgent became the need for a unified currency. Thus, in 1999 the 
EU created the euro and established the European Central bank (ECB), considered by many 
the most significant event in international finance since WWII. For the first time a group of 
sovereign nations voluntarily gave up their national currency and monetary policy for a 
common European one, the euro (Salvatore, 2002). The first to accept the euro were Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain in 1999 followed by Greece in 2000 (European Central Bank, 2010). 
Ever since its establishment in 1999, the European Central Bank has worked on 
maintaining relative price stability, mainly through inflation targeting. The ECB aims at a target 
inflation rate below but close to 2%. However, the diversity among the member states in the 
European Union and the Eurozone requires not only collective attention on the EU economy 
but also careful consideration of each individual member state. Some Eurozone member 
states experience generally higher levels of inflation and higher unemployment. For them 
inflation targeting policy may not be the best choice.  On the other side are countries like 
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Germany which have relatively low unemployment levels in comparison to other countries 
and therefore are more concerned with maintaining low inflation. The German inflation rate is 
the lowest among the 12 Eurozone countries. (European Central Bank, 2010). Many 
economists and politicians criticize the Union’s Central Bank for the process of monetary 
decision making in such a large and diverse single-currency area as the European Monetary 
Union (EMU). These decisions affect various member states differently and could drive their 
economies out of alignment (Salvatore, 2002).  
The main purpose of this paper is to study the reasoning behind this common criticism 
of the European Central bank and test whether the ECB's monetary policy is beneficial for the 
Eurozone as a whole or only for a select group of countries that have similar economic 
profiles.  The paper investigates whether Germany and other countries from the Eurozone 
with similar economic conditions experience less stress due to their voting power or size 
advantage. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes in depth the background of the 
project as revealed in the literature. Section III outlines the empirical model and the 
econometric methods employed. Section IV describes the data.  Furthermore, Sections V 
presents the results of the paper. Lastly, Section VI concludes the paper with implications and 
suggestions for future research. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Background 
 The European Central Bank (ECB) is at the core of the central banking system known 
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as the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The ESCB consists of all 27 EU member 
National Central Banks and the ECB. All 27 National Central Banks report their economic 
performance and recommendations to the ECB. However, only the Eurozone member states 
– those which have adopted the euro – actively participate in the monetary policy decision-
making. 
  Within the European banking system decisions are made by the Executive Board, the 
Governing Board and the General Council. The Executive Board consists of a President, a 
Vice President, and four Board members from Eurozone states. The Governing Board consists 
of national governors from the Central Banks of the countries in the Eurozone. The Governing 
Board's responsibilities include adopting guidelines and performing tasks entrusted to the 
Eurosystem. It also formulates monetary policies for the Eurozone including decisions relating 
to monetary objectives, key interest rates, the supply of reserves in the Eurosystem, and the 
establishment of guidelines for the implementation of these decisions.  The General Council 
consists of all 27 governors of national Central Banks in the EU and the President and Vice 
President of the ECB. Some of the key responsibilities of the General Council are to contribute 
to the ECB by providing advisory recommendations, collecting statistical information, 
preparing the ECB's annual reports, and participating in determining exchange rates among 
the non-Eurozone member states.  The General Council will be dissolved once all European 
Union member states join the Eurozone and adopt the euro (European Central Bank, 2010). 
The creation of such a complex Eurosystem expands on the already established 
national central bank systems and simultaneously respects the national political and cultural 
diversity among the Eurozone member states.  The most important decision-making bodies 
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within the system are the Executive Board and the Governing Board.  
 
Stress level indicator 
 The stress in a particular country is defined in previous literature as the difference 
between the country's actual short-term interest rate and the optimal interest rate if the 
country had an independent monetary policy. The actual monetary policy is set by the 
European Central Bank through its short-term interest rate. The optimal monetary policy is 
calculated using a variant of the Taylor rule. The Taylor rule is a macroeconomic tool which 
takes into account countries’ specific inflation and output data and estimates the optimal 
interest rate for the country. The Taylor rule was first used to estimate the optimal interest rate 
for the U.S. Since then researchers have estimated variants of the tool that work for the 
European Union and the ECB’s monetary policy (Bernanke, 2010).   
One study which deals with applications of the Taylor rule for the European Central 
Bank is Flaig and Wollmershaeuser (2003). They find that the stress in Germany is close to zero 
for the period between 1999 and 2005. Their main results suggest that stress in the Eurozone is 
a result of the different trend growth rates and the very low interest rates for the period 
examined. (Flaig and Wollmershaeuser, 2007).  In order to find the optimal interest rate for 
each country, they use a modified Taylor rule. It includes a smoothing term and allocates 
various weights to output and inflation depending on the model specifics that the authors 
investigate. Sauer and Sturm also use the Taylor rule to explain the ECB's monetary policy. In 
their study on the ECB monetary policy, Sauer and Sturm give a comprehensive list of 
previous studies on the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank, which estimate the 
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Taylor rule coefficients.  
 The cause of high stress for some Eurozone members and low stress for others is the 
European Central Bank’s choice of actual monetary policy. If the ECB chooses a monetary 
policy which is close to a country’s Taylor rule optimum then that country experiences low 
stress. If the ECB chooses a monetary policy diverging from a country’s optimum then that 
country experiences high stress. Therefore, it is crucial to know the factors influencing the 
ECB’s choice and their impact on individual countries and on the entire Eurozone. 
 
German Dominance Hypothesis  
The literature identifies several hypotheses regarding the choice of monetary policies. 
One of them known as the German Dominance Hypothesis (GDH) posits that Germany has a 
prevailing role in the decision-making process in the European Central Bank. First of all, there 
are multiple similarities between the ECB and the Bundesbank, such as shared monetary 
policy objectives. The ECB has even been named “twin sister of the Bundesbank” mostly 
because it was initially modeled on the German central bank (Debrun, 2001). Furthermore, 
the structure of the main decision-making process includes three decision making bodies 
within the ECB:  the Governing Board, the Executive board and the General Council. 
Germany has had a representative on the Executive board ever since the ECB's 
establishment. Also, it is part of the Governing Board and General Council. The German 
Dominance Hypothesis claims that the decisions made by the ECB are influenced by the 
prevailing voting power of Germany as the biggest economic force in the Eurozone.  Even 
though such dominance is against the official principles of the ECB, in reality some countries 
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in the EU may have more influence compared to others.  Heinemann and Huefner, for 
example, find German dominance present in the Eurozone using a Taylor rule estimation 
procedure for the period from the ECB establishment to 2002.  
 Based on previous literature and the notion that the ECB cannot possibly 
accommodate the monetary needs of all Eurozone member states, this paper investigates 
the discrepancies between ECB monetary policies and German monetary “expectations.” If 
the GDH holds true for the time period under investigation then Germany and other countries 
with similar macroeconomic profiles would experience lower stress levels. Using the 
Eurosystem decision-making structure as the basis for the empirical model, the paper 
investigates whether Germany and like countries experience less stress.  
  
Voting System 
This paper looks into two aspects of the voting system in the ECB. On one hand, 
literature presents the “one country one vote power” theory which opposes the German 
Dominance hypothesis. On the other hand, the structure of the ECB presents a problematic 
extra vote that some countries have because they are represented on the Executive Board. 
Berger and Haan (2002) argue that the current voting system in the EU both on a political and 
ECB level suggests an over-representation of small countries versus larger ones. This is known 
as the “one country one vote power” theory.  For example, Germany has only one vote on 
the Governing Board, the same as Luxembourg and Belgium.  Unless represented on the 
Executive Board each member has exactly one vote. Thus, some authors have suggested 
that smaller Eurozone members are over-represented. (Berger and Haan, 2002). The “one 
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country one vote” theory also suggests that larger economies experience higher stress levels 
due to the uneven balance between their GDP size and their voting power. If this theory 
holds then Germany and the other countries alike would experience greater stress levels as 
compared to smaller economies in the Eurozone .  
Furthermore, the voting structure of the ECB suggests an additional variable that tests 
for the amount of actual voting power in the model is crucial for accounting for the political 
aspects of the topic under consideration. Such a variable would account for a country’s 
representation on the Executive Board. Each country in the Eurozone has one vote in the 
General Council, which is used for making important monetary decisions such as interest rate 
changes. However, some countries have an additional vote because they have a 
representative on the Executive Board. Even though there is no country with an explicit 
permanent seat on the Executive Board, it is clear from the ECB’s past that Germany, France, 
Italy, and Spain have always been represented on the Executive Board. Thus, accounting for 
the Executive Board representation of certain member states is important. If a country is 
represented on the Executive Board then it has a total of two votes which implies more 
influence in the decision-making process.  As a result countries on the Executive Board 
experience lower stress levels. 
 
Political Factors: Economic Freedom Index 
 Lastly, several studies look into political factors influencing macroeconomic 
divergence and the ECB's decision-making process. Berger and Haan investigate the risk of 
national considerations prevailing over Eurozone considerations. They find that the ECB 
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decision-making includes not only economic factors but also political differences across 
countries. Another paper investigating political instability and inflation volatility uses a set a 
political factors in order to determine their impact on the inflation changes (Aisen and Veiga, 
2006). They use the index of economic freedom as a measurement of political stability and 
more flexible regulation. They find that political stability is a key driver for the policy-makers in 
developing countries and should be considered more carefully for long-run economic 
prosperity.  The theory on economic freedom posits that countries which are generally more 
economically free experience less stress in their monetary policy decision-making. The higher 
the index of economic freedom the more politically free the country is and the less stress 
levels it experiences.  
 
III. Empirical model 
 The empirical estimation of such stress indicators requires the implementation of a 
macroeconomic tool well-known as the Taylor rule. It is used to estimate the country’s optimal 
interest rate in order to calculate each country’s individual stress level. The Taylor rule was first 
developed for the Federal Reserve’s interest rate estimation by John Taylor of Stanford 
University but has since been used in multiple studies of the ECB (Bernanke, 2010).  
The Taylor rule is presented in equation (1.1): 
(1.1) iit = πit+rit*+ απ(πit-πt*)+αy(Yit-Yt*).  
It is used to estimate the optimal short-run nominal interest rate given a set of economic 
conditions. In this equation, rit* is the assumed nominal interest rate for each country and πit is 
the inflation rate in each of the Eurozone member states. The other two expressions represent 
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the difference between actual and target inflation in the EU and the difference between 
actual and potential output.  The outcomes of the Taylor rule depend on the weight 
allocated to inflation and output gaps as well as the way those variables are measured. In his 
recent speech, Bernanke points out that the difficulties in measuring the output gap in real 
time are well known and that the choice of inflation may also be crucial for the Taylor rule 
implementation (Bernanke, 2010). The Taylor rule has been successfully applied in the past 
and worked equally well for both the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank 
(Grauwe, 2002 and Gorter, 2008).  
 In practice, it is more common for central banks worldwide to move interest rates in 
small steps without reversing direction quickly. In order to account for this so-called 
smoothing, Equation (1.2) is used as a reaction function of the Taylor rule: 
(1.2)  iit=(1-ρ)α + (1-ρ)(gππit+gyYit) + ρit-1+ε 
In this equation, gπ and  gy are the estimated weights on inflation and output gap and ρ is the 
smoothing parameter. The role of the smoothing parameter is to account for gradual 
changes in interest rates and to estimate more accurate optimal interest rates. 
 Sauer and Sturm provide a comprehensive comparative table of such reaction 
function coefficients based on the various existing estimates in previous literature. For reasons 
of data compatibility, this paper focuses on three main studies by Ulrich (2003), Gerdesmeier 
and Roffia ( 2003), and Fourcans and Vranceanu (2002). Since the purpose of this paper is 
not to estimate the Taylor rule coefficient but to apply the rule in a model accounting for the 
discrepancies in the decision-making process we use the estimated weights and coefficients 
as provided by these three studies. Once the interest rates are calculated, a stress level is 
Teodora D. Petrova 
12 
estimated as the difference between the optimal and actual interest rates. Each of the 
estimated stress levels is used as the dependent variable in the model and is called 
respectively Stress 1, Stress 2, and Stress 3. Stress 1 and Stress 3 are calculated with allocating 
equal weight on the output gap. While the Stress 2 model allocates almost twice as much 
weight on the output gap.  Among the three calculations, Stress 2 has the lowest weight on 
the inflation gap and Stress 3 allocates the highest weight respective to the other two 
calculations. Table 1. shows the correlation among the three stress levels. Each of the three 
stresses is calculated with coefficients from the three major studies on the topic discussed 
earlier. The results in the table establish that the three methods yield very similar measures of 
stress.  
  Table 1. Stress level correlations: 
  
Stress 
1 
Stress 
2 Stress3 
Stress 
1 1.0000 0.9965 0.9912 
Stress 
2 0.9965 1.0000 0.9981 
Stress 
3 0.9912 0.9981 1.0000 
  
Several studies on the topic of national divergence in the Eurozone suggest the 
importance of considering political factors influencing the stress indicators (Berger and 
Mueller, 2004; and Berger and Haam, 2002). Such political factors are voting power of the 
member states, Executive Board representation, Economic Freedom and GDP weight of the 
countries. In addition, the paper suggests that certain country representatives could reflect 
their national party interests when deciding on a European level and thus affect the ECB 
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decision-making process. Party conflicts or general national political instability could result in 
imbalance in the voting and decision-making. However, the lack of information on individual 
member state party stability prevents us from including this variable in the model. 
  
The following equation represents the model: 
Stressit= α + β*Executive Boardit+γ*Economic Freedomit+δ*GDP weghtit+εit 
 
 The variables and their expected signs are:  
 
 Stressit (dependent variable) – A country’s individual stress indicator, calculated as 
optimal interest rate minus actual interest rate; 
 Executive Boardit (-) – A country’s voting power, based on the number of votes. 
Countries with more votes have more influence and as a result lower stress. This is a 
dummy variable with values 0 if the countries do not have representation on the 
Executive Board and 1 if they do. 
 Economic Freedomit (-) – A country’s index of economic freedom, used to measure 
political stability. More politically free countries have higher economic freedom 
indexes which would reflect into a lower stress level. 
 GDP weghtit (+/-) – A country’s GDP weight in the Eurozone: There are two 
contradicting theories which need to be considered when determining the sign of this 
variable. On one hand, as suggested by the GDH, the larger the size of the economy 
the more influence and the less stress that country experiences. On the other hand, 
the “one country, one vote theory” tends to allocate disproportionate power to 
Teodora D. Petrova 
14 
smaller countries. As a result larger GDP weight might result in more stress based on the 
imbalance of votes.  
 
IV. Data 
 The data for the empirical tests come from the European statistical database also 
known as EUROSTAT. For the estimation of the regression model we construct a panel 
consisting of 11 European Union member states over a period between 2000 and 2007. The 
Eurozone currently consists of 16 member states, four of which joined in 2007, 2008, and 2009. 
These last four members are all small Eastern European countries, which might cause a 
statistical bias in the results because these countries were not in the Eurozone or in the Union 
in the early years of the ECB. Insufficient data for Portugal required taking it out of the list of 
countries under consideration. Preliminary tests suggest that the data during 2008 and 2009 
should be omitted because during the recent financial crisis, the ECB policies were 
completely atypical.  Thus, the paper looks at the “oldest” 11 members of the Eurozone 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
and Spain) using data with monthly observations for the period between 2000 and 2007.  
The observations for inflation and interest rates are on a monthly basis. Since the GDP 
data are complied on a quarterly basis, this study follows other researchers in using industrial 
production for an output estimate (Heineman and Huefner, 2004). Industrial production is 
available on a monthly basis and is used for calculating the output gap in the Taylor rule 
reaction function. The potential industrial production is estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott 
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filter. The Hodrick-Prescott filter is a mathematical tool commonly used in obtaining a 
smoothed non-linear representation of time-series data. Most previous studies estimating a 
Taylor rule reaction function use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to smooth their industrial 
production while calculating the output gap. In order to estimate the inflation gap in the 
Taylor rule we use the inflation target rate which is set in the ECB's objective and is 2%. The 
data for the Index of Economic Freedom come from the Annual Reports of Economic 
Freedom of the World. Voting power data are obtained from the European Central Bank 
website. The total number of observations is only 847 because the data set eliminates any 
missing cases. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: 
  Stress1 
Stress 
2 
Stress 
3 
Executive 
board Economic Freedom 
GDP 
weight 
Predicted sign Dependant variable - - +/- 
 Mean 1.07 0.61 1.44 0.58 69.76 0.09 
 Median 1.26 0.76 1.66 1.00 69.70 0.04 
 Std. Dev. 4.05 2.59 6.47 0.49 6.64 0.09 
 Observations 847 847 847 847 847 847 
 Cross 
sections 11 11 11 11 11 11 
 
 
 
Table 2. shows the descriptive statistics of the variables in the model along with their 
predicted sign. Stress 1, Stress 2 and Stress 3 are the dependent variables as calculated by 
the Taylor rule with three sets of coefficients. The Executive board variable is an independent 
variable which controls for the voting power in the Eurozone.  It is a dummy variable with 
values of 1 if the country has a representative on the Executive board and 0 if it is not 
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represented on the Executive Board of the Governing Council. According to previous 
literature, if a country is represented on the Executive Board and has more votes it 
experiences lower stress levels. The Economic Freedom is the independent variable which 
controls for other political factors such as political and economic freedom. It is measured by 
the Index of Economic Freedom. The more politically and economically free the country is 
the lower the stress it experiences. Lastly, the GDP weight is the independent variable which 
controls for the GDP size of the countries and their respective weight in the Eurozone. The sign 
of this variable depends on two opposing theories. On one side we have the German 
Dominance Hypothesis which suggests that larger economies experience lower stress levels. 
On the other side, we have the “one country one vote power” theory which suggests that 
smaller countries are generally overrepresented in the Governing Council respective to their 
GDP size. In this scenario, the smaller the country the smaller the stress levels it experiences. 
 
V.  Results 
After careful calculations using the Taylor rule, three different stress levels are estimated 
for the 11 member states over the period between 2000 and 2007. Each of them is regressed 
with the independent variables as presented in the model equation.  Table3 represents the 
results from the regressions using a panel data set with a total of 847 observations accounting 
for fixed effects: 
 
Table 3. Results:    
Variable Stress 1 Stress 2 Stress 3 
Constant 14.26**  8.15*  17.61* 
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 (5.66) (3.68) (9.22) 
Executive Board 3.65**  2.26** 5.49** 
 (0.36) (0.23) (0.11) 
Economic 
Freedom -0.12** -0.068* -0.13 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.59) 
GDP weight -79.98* -47.14* -117.58* 
  (39.37) (25.53) (63.98) 
Fixed Effects:    
Austria -7.00 -4.15 -10.33 
Belgium -3.55 -2.02 -5.04 
Finland -9.45 -5.67 -14.29 
France 6.92 3.60 9.38 
Germany 12.83 7.46 18.62 
Greece -3.96 -2.19 -6.07 
Ireland 0.86 0.69 1.12 
Italy 5.00 2.97 7.67 
Luxembourg -2.57 -1.36 -3.81 
Netherlands -1.32 -0.74 -1.79 
Spain 2.23 1.41 3.58 
Sample size:  847 847 847 
R-squared 0.476 0.458 0.452 
* Significance levels at 0.05 
**Significance levels at 0.01 
 
The Executive Board variable, which represents the voting power of the countries in the 
Eurozone shows significant results. The results are significant at 0.01 levels in all three models 
suggesting the importance of Executive Board representation in the monetary policy 
decision-making. However, the sign of the coefficient is consistently the opposite of what 
theory suggests.  If a country is represented on the Executive Board then it experiences stress 
levels higher by 3.65 percentage points in the Stress 1 model, 2.26 in Stress 2, and 5.49 in Stress 
3.  The results show that countries which are represented on the Executive Board experience 
larger stress levels than those not on the Executive Board. Part of the explanation could be 
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found in the European Central Bank’s main principles which claim that Executive Board 
representatives serve the ECB and should withhold their national interests in favor of the 
general Eurozone interests. Further investigation of the voting power is necessary for better 
understanding the implications of voting power imbalance in the ECB. 
 The next important independent variable is the Economic freedom index which shows 
the correct signs as predicted by theory. Unfortunately, the results for the index are not 
consistently significant throughout the three different models.  As shown in Table 3, in the first 
model with stress levels calculated with Ulrich’s coefficients, the index of economic freedom 
is significant at 0.01 levels confirming finding from literature. On the other hand, the results for 
the other two models calculated using coefficients from respectively Gerdesmeier and Roffia 
(2003) and Fourcans and Vranceanu (2002) are significant at 0.05 levels or not significant at 
all. Despite the variation in significance of the results, the consistency of the coefficient sign 
suggests that theory on the impact of political factors holds true for the countries and period 
under investigation.  The Index of Economic Freedom is measured on a scale of up to 100. 
The more economically free the country the higher its Economic Freedom index. The results 
suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in economic freedom would result in a decrease 
between 0.068 and 0.13.  
The results for the GDP weight of the countries are consistently significant at 0.05 levels. 
They maintain the correct sign supporting the German Dominance Hypothesis. Countries with 
larger GDP weight in the Eurozone tend to have more influence in the union and experience 
lower stress levels. In Stress 1 and Stress 3 models, the results show that a 1 percentage point 
increase in the GDP weight of a country is reflected by a 79.90 percentage points decrease 
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and 117.58 percentage points decrease, respectively. The numbers for Stress 2 model look 
drastically different. A one percent increase in GDP weight would result in only 47.14 
percentage point decrease in stress levels.  
The differences among the three models can be partially explained by the calculation 
methodology. Stress 1 model is calculated by allocating more weight on output divergence 
in the optimal interest rate calculation and less weight on inflation. Stress 2 and Stress 3 
models allocated less weight on output. However, Stress 3 allocated almost twice as much 
weight on inflation as the Stress 2 model.  Despite the differences in the calculation method, 
the GDP weight variable shows important implications of the German Dominance Hypothesis. 
Larger economies experience significantly lower stress levels respective to their GDP weight in 
the Eurozone, which reaffirms the GDH. 
Lastly, the fixed effects results shown in Table 3 are interesting.  Each coefficient 
represents country effects not captured in the preceding explanatory variables. Germany, 
which gets the greatest reduction in stress due to its GDP weight, has the largest 
counteracting country effect. Overall, the larger economies tend to have the largest positive 
country effects, meaning that something is increasing stress. And the smaller economies tend 
to have the largest negative country effects, meaning something is reducing stress. A possible 
hypothesis for future research is that the effect of GDP weight is nonlinear, so that it overstates 
the effect of GDP weight at the extremes. 
  
VI. Conclusion 
The European Central Bank and its monetary policy decision-making have often been 
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criticized for their undemocratic principles. Previous studies suggest that Germany has a 
prevailing role in the Eurozone and significant impact on the decision-making process which 
favors its own macroeconomic stability.  
This paper aims at investigating various political factors along with countries’ size in the 
Eurozone which affect the stress levels they experience. The results support the German 
Dominance Hypothesis which suggests that Germany and other larger economies have 
greater impact on the decision-making process and experience lower levels of stress. In 
addition, the indexes of economic freedom results also confirm the theory that politically free 
and stable countries such as Germany and France tend to have smaller stress levels. 
However, the results suggest that presence on the Executive Board does not necessarily favor 
countries and does not result in lower stress levels. According to the regression analysis, 
countries represented on the Executive Board tend to experience higher levels of stress. 
Further analysis of the voting power and implementation of a better measurement of voting 
power is important for the thoroughness of the analysis. 
Several problems can be identified with regard to the estimation methodology. First of 
all, the Taylor rule is still the best available estimation tool to calculate the optimal interest 
rates a Central Bank could implement. However, various studies in the field outline multiple 
problems with this estimation procedure. The Taylor rule is criticized for not being applicable 
for the monetary policy analysis of the European Central Bank (Sauer and Sturm, 2003). In 
addition, as stated by Bernanke (2010) in his recent speech, the methodology used to 
calculate the variables and the data used for each variable makes a difference in using the 
Taylor rule efficiently. As a result, finding an alternative procedure for estimating optimal 
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interest rates in future research could improve the quality of the calculated stress levels. 
Second, the paper uses a Hodrick-Prescott filter as a mathematical tool to smoothen the time 
series data for the industrial production.  This procedure has also been criticized for its 
applicability in data analysis and its implementation when used in the Taylor rule calculations. 
Lastly, some of the data used to measure the influence of multiple political factors can be 
improved by using better quantifiable measurements. Unfortunately, there are no good data 
available that account for various political aspects of ECB’s monetary policy decision-making 
such as a variable accounting for political party stability in the countries of the Eurozone.  
Future research on the topic requires more careful analysis of the estimation 
methodology and expansion of the variables accounting for political factors. In addition, 
accounting for a non-linearity for the GDP weight in the model could improve the quality of 
the model.  Last but not least, estimation of the actual Taylor rule coefficients for the actual 
period of investigation using the data available can improve the results and quality of the 
research presented in this paper. 
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